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СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASATokyo's Manila diplomacy linked ASEAN security cooperation to a wider Indo-Pacific network stretching to the Pacific Islands.
Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu’s visit to Manila last week was more than another round of ASEAN diplomacy. It represented one of the clearest public manifestations of Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, demonstrating how Japan is shifting its engagement with Southeast Asia beyond traditional development assistance toward practical security cooperation.
Takaichi outlined that strategy in a foreign policy speech at Vietnam National University in Hanoi on May 2, marking a decade since the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo first proposed the FOIP vision. Takaichi argued that intensifying geopolitical competition, rapid technological innovation, and the rise of the Global South require Indo-Pacific countries to strengthen their “autonomy” and “resilience.” Her updated FOIP strategy identified three priorities: building economic infrastructure for the AI and data age, including resilient energy and critical mineral supply chains; promoting growth through public-private cooperation and shared rules; and expanding security cooperation to preserve regional peace and stability.
Equally important, Takaichi stressed that FOIP complements rather than competes with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The message was intended to reassure Southeast Asian governments that Japan supports ASEAN-led regional institutions while helping member states strengthen their own strategic autonomy.
Motegi’s diplomacy in Manila put that vision into practice.
At the ASEAN-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 22, he described ASEAN as being “at the core” of Japan’s FOIP vision and pledged closer cooperation in maritime security, economic security, energy resilience, artificial intelligence, and disaster response.
Motegi also said Japan “strongly opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion” in the East and South China Seas, language widely understood as directed at China even when Beijing is not named. He further called for any future South China Sea Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN to conform to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The clearest evidence of Japan’s changing approach is Official Security Assistance (OSA), introduced in 2023 to provide defense equipment and infrastructure directly to the armed forces and related organizations of partner countries. Unlike traditional development assistance, OSA is explicitly designed to strengthen recipients’ security and deterrence capabilities.
Recent projects include monitoring and surveillance equipment for the Philippines, a diving support vessel and equipment for ASEAN observer teams in Malaysia, high-speed patrol boats for Indonesia, maritime search-and-rescue equipment for Thailand, and communications equipment and patrol boats for Cambodia. Phnom Penh’s participation is particularly noteworthy, suggesting that even one of Beijing’s closest partners in Southeast Asia sees value in diversifying its external security relationships.
Japan is also moving beyond equipment transfers. Tokyo and Hanoi agreed earlier this month to begin discussions on the possible joint development and production of fast landing craft. The Philippines, meanwhile, remains Japan’s closest regional security partner: during the Manila meetings, Motegi and his Philippine counterpart exchanged diplomatic notes bringing their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement – signed in January – into force as of August 22, alongside continued radar transfers and expanding joint military exercises.
Tokyo is also trying to connect Southeast Asia with the wider Pacific security architecture. At the third Japan-Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue in February, ASEAN countries participated as observers for the first time. The meeting focused on climate security, disaster relief, and maritime resilience, but it was also shaped by concern over China’s expanding influence in Pacific Island countries.
The linkage suggests Tokyo increasingly views maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands as a connected strategic space rather than separate diplomatic tracks. This approach also reflects Abe Shinzo’s vision of Japan as a “dot connector” linking like-minded partners across the Indo-Pacific. The Quad reinforced the same approach in Manila by pledging deeper cooperation with ASEAN on maritime security, critical technologies, economic security, and humanitarian assistance.
Most Southeast Asian governments, for their part, are seeking stronger maritime capabilities and more strategic options without wanting to be forced to choose between Beijing and either Washington or Tokyo.
China nevertheless views Japan’s expanding regional role with growing suspicion. Chinese officials warned against a “revival of militarism,” while Beijing rejected Motegi’s account of a brief exchange with Foreign Minister Wang Yi and state media dismissed the episode as political theater. More fundamentally, Chinese commentators increasingly portray Japan’s higher defense spending, long-range missile programs, deeper integration with the United States, and expanding security partnerships in Southeast Asia as evidence that Tokyo is abandoning its postwar restraint.
ASEAN governments are unlikely to respond uniformly. The Philippines and Vietnam have proven the most receptive to cooperation with Japan because of growing maritime pressure from China. Indonesia and Malaysia welcome capacity-building while remaining cautious about appearing aligned against Beijing. Cambodia and Laos remain more constrained by their close ties with China.
Yet even if the progress is uneven with individual partner countries, overall Japan is steadily institutionalizing security cooperation across Southeast Asia while linking it to a wider Indo-Pacific network extending to the Pacific Islands.
Whether that strategy succeeds will depend less on Beijing’s criticism than on whether Southeast Asian governments continue to see Tokyo as a partner that enhances their autonomy rather than constrains it.
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