The 25th anniversary of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) invites reflection on far more than the longevity and electoral achievements of a political organization. It marks a critical moment in Türkiye’s continuing search for a viable relationship between tradition and modernity, faith and democracy, social representation and state authority, national sovereignty and participation in the global order.

Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, social groups long situated at the political and cultural periphery moved toward the center, transforming both the institutions of power and the meaning of political belonging. While the AK Party’s first quarter-century can be considered a chapter in Türkiye’s deeper historical struggle to define its identity, exercise its agency and shape its own path to modernity, we need to ask whether its second quarter-century can translate political endurance into institutional wisdom, social justice and a compelling vision of the future.

New vision of modernization

Türkiye’s political experience attracts attention across the Muslim and Turkic worlds because it addresses a fundamental question: Can a country modernize without abandoning its history, strengthen the state without suppressing society, and engage globally without losing its independence?

Founded under Erdoğan’s leadership in 2001, the AK Party offered a distinctly Turkish answer. It brought millions of religiously conservative and socially underrepresented citizens into the center of national politics. After nearly 25 years, the party is no longer an outsider challenging the political establishment, and it has become one of the principal forces shaping it.

In many Muslim societies, modernization was associated with colonialism or secular elites who sought to exclude religion and tradition from public life. Türkiye’s secular republic built strong institutions and promoted modernization, but headscarf restrictions, limits on religious education, and bureaucratic control alienated many conservative citizens.

Similar debates emerged across the Muslim world, from the Arab Nahda and Iran to Malaysia, Indonesia and post-Soviet Central Asia. The AK Party gained support by arguing that citizens did not have to choose between faith and modernity. Türkiye could embrace democracy, technology, markets and international engagement while preserving its historical and cultural identity.

The AK Party emerged from a political tradition extending back to the Ottoman reform era. Ottomanists, Islamists, Turkists and Westernisers all confronted the same dilemma: How could the state regain its strength without losing its identity?

In the republican period, then-Prime Minister Adnan Menderes represented provincial and conservative voters and defended electoral legitimacy. His successors Süleyman Demirel prioritized rural development and infrastructure, while Necmettin Erbakan organized religious conservatives around moral development, industrialization and cooperation among Muslim-majority countries. Turgut Özal promoted entrepreneurship, economic liberalisation and integration with global markets.

Erdoğan combined the traditions of his predecessors: Menderes’s commitment to elected government, Demirel’s developmental vision, Erbakan’s moral identity and social organization, and Özal’s economic dynamism. His direct connection with ordinary citizens, municipal experience and emphasis on national autonomy helped create a broad coalition of devout citizens, workers, farmers, shopkeepers, Anatolian entrepreneurs, lower-income urban families and nationalist voters seeking a stronger and more confident Türkiye.

Recognition through development

The AK Party’s repeated electoral victories cannot be explained by identity politics alone. Political recognition was accompanied by visible improvements in public services.

Hospitals, universities, airports, roads, bridges, mass-transit systems and social assistance programs transformed everyday life. Services previously concentrated in major cities expanded across Anatolia. For citizens outside the traditional metropolitan elites, these investments had emotional as well as economic significance. A university in an Anatolian city, a hospital in a provincial district or an airport connecting a remote region to the world signalled that its inhabitants mattered to the state. This combination of recognition and development helps explain why the AK Party won successive elections and remained Türkiye’s dominant political force.

I, personally, find the Turkish case similar to Southeast Asia, where political legitimacy has often been closely connected to development. Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrated in different ways that Muslim-majority societies could engage with global markets while retaining a visible religious identity.

Türkiye’s Anatolian entrepreneurs reinforced the same argument. Cities such as Kayseri, Konya and Gaziantep showed that export-led growth, technological ambition and commercial innovation could flourish in culturally conservative environments. Religious commitment and economic productivity did not have to be adversaries.

Electoral authority, independence

Another source of the AK Party’s support was its struggle against military and bureaucratic tutelage. Turkish democracy had repeatedly been interrupted by coups, military memorandums and institutional interventions. Efforts to strengthen civilian rule were therefore understood by supporters as part of a longer struggle for popular sovereignty.

The removal of headscarf restrictions became one of the most visible symbols of this transformation. Women who had faced exclusion from universities, public employment and elected office gained wider access to public life. Supporters regarded this not as replacing secular pressure with religious pressure, but as restoring equal citizenship to women who wished to participate in modern society without abandoning their convictions.

Türkiye simultaneously pursued greater autonomy abroad. The expansion of its defense industry, regional diplomacy and diversified international relationships reflected an aspiration widely shared across the Global South: cooperation without subordination.

This ambition resonated in the Arab world, where memories of colonial partition remain strong; in North Africa, where sovereignty occupies an important place in political thought; in Southeast Asia, where development has often been linked to strategic independence; and among the Turkic republics, which have sought greater room for manoeuvre since the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Strategic autonomy did not mean disengagement from the West. Türkiye remained a NATO member, deeply connected to the European economy and engaged with powers across the world. However, its objective was to broaden its partnerships and negotiate from a position of greater capacity.

Türkiye’s wider reach with Erdoğan

Erdoğan’s personal story reflects the social ascent of the communities he represents: a politician from a modest Istanbul neighbourhood who rose through local politics, became mayor, was imprisoned after reciting a poem and later emerged as the dominant figure in national life.

For his supporters, this represented more than individual achievement. It symbolized the arrival at the heart of the state of people who had long regarded themselves as peripheral. His ability to mobilize voters and confront established centers of power enabled him to retain support through economic crises, regional wars, institutional conflict and the attempted coup of July 2016.

His influence also extended beyond Türkiye. Some Arab audiences viewed Türkiye’s regional activism and support for Palestine as evidence that a Muslim-majority state could acquire a stronger international voice. Across Africa and Asia, Turkish trade, humanitarian aid, education and diplomacy helped project an image of historical identity combined with modern capacity.

In the Turkic world, closer relations with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics acquired institutional form through the Organization of Turkic States. These connections drew on shared language and historical memory while serving contemporary economic and strategic interests.

Tunisia, Egypt and other regional states naturally assess Türkiye from their own political perspectives. They may cooperate, compete or disagree with Ankara. Yet Turkish debates over sovereignty, external dependency and domestic legitimacy address concerns found across the region.

Challenge of next generation

The AK Party’s first quarter-century answered major questions of recognition and representation. It also helped create a society with different expectations.

Young conservatives no longer experience exclusion in the same way as their parents. Many attend university, travel abroad and enter public life without concealing their identity. This is partly a result of the AK Party’s reforms. Yet that success has changed the terms of political competition.

Past grievances alone will not satisfy younger voters. They demand high-quality education, meaningful employment, merit-based advancement, economic stability, technological opportunity and confidence that Türkiye can compete at the highest level.

The AK Party’s next phase must therefore match cultural inclusion with scientific and economic progress. Its founding ideals of justice and development require contemporary expression through trustworthy institutions, equality of opportunity, higher productivity and sustainable prosperity.

Türkiye’s defense industry demonstrates what sustained strategic commitment can achieve. The next challenge is to reproduce that success in artificial intelligence, energy, biotechnology, space research, advanced manufacturing and education.

Renewal also requires stronger connections between political institutions and society. The AK Party originally succeeded by carrying the demands of ordinary citizens into the state. Reinvigorating that relationship through younger cadres, effective local organizations and participatory decision-making could reduce the distance created by long incumbency.

A second Türkiye century

Türkiye’s experience cannot be exported as a ready-made model. Indonesia’s pluralist democracy, Malaysia’s developmental path, Tunisia’s unsettled post-revolutionary politics, the Arab world’s diverse systems and the post-Soviet evolution of Central Asia each reflect distinct histories.

Türkiye nevertheless offers a broader lesson: The choice between tradition and modernity need not be absolute. A Muslim-majority society can maintain a meaningful relationship with its religious and historical identity while pursuing electoral legitimacy, economic development, technological advancement and national autonomy.

Türkiye is not a ready-made model for other countries, but its experience shows that tradition and modernity can coexist. The AK Party’s first 25 years expanded political inclusion, infrastructure and national capacity. Its next era will be judged by its ability to strengthen institutions, uphold the rule of law, control inflation, improve education and create opportunities for younger generations.

Erdoğan transformed Türkiye’s search for identity, development and autonomy into a mass political movement. Its future success will depend not on past victories, but on building prosperity, scientific strength, social justice and trustworthy institutions. If Türkiye succeeds, its experience may offer valuable lessons to societies across the Muslim and Turkic worlds.