Read the full transcript of Fyodor Lukyanov’s interview on Greater Eurasia Podcast, August 15, 2026.

EDITOR’S NOTE: In this discussion, Professor Glenn Diesen interviews Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, on Russia’s evolving strategy as the post-Cold War world order unravels. Lukyanov examines the prolonged Ukraine conflict, Europe’s role in obstructing diplomacy, the broader implications of shifting global power dynamics—including the Iran situation—and Moscow’s focus on long-term resilience amid institutional decline and rising multipolarity. The conversation offers a clear-eyed Russian perspective on the end of Western hegemony and the uncertain order emerging in its place.

INTRODUCTION

GLENN DIESEN: Welcome back. Today we’re joined by Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs journal and also the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, as well as a research professor at the Higher School of Economics. So thank you for coming back on the program.

FYODOR LUKYANOV: Thank you very much for inviting me. Hi, Glenn.

GLENN DIESEN: So I’ve been wanting to ask you both about the Ukraine War and the Iran War in terms of how the world looks like from Russia, but also how especially the Iran War affects Russia. But I thought a good place to start would be the Ukraine War, as well, this war has changed a lot over the past four and a half years in terms of how it’s been fought, the degree the different participants have been involved, but the participants themselves have changed over the past four and a half years than the position of the European leaders and Russia are especially hardening, and there’s more willingness to take risks. I was just wondering now, where do you see this war heading now? Because it seems to be escalating.

FYODOR LUKYANOV: First of all, today as we speak, there is one day before an anniversary of the so-called Anchorage meeting. The Alaska summit between Putin and Trump, August 15th, which produced a lot of hopes, and I would even say exaltation, about the possibility to stop this war and to achieve a diplomatic and political solution.

So the year after this conversation, we see that it failed, basically. It did not produce anything like end of hostilities. More than that, the result of that attempt was actually the conclusion on the side of Ukraine and Europe, which supports Ukraine now 100% and is de facto part of this military confrontation. So the conclusion made by that side was that it should be escalation in order to convince the American side, President Trump in particular, that his idea, his conclusion, which he had at that time, that Ukraine is bound to lose this war, that’s why they should compromise as quickly as possible and give up Donbas and fulfill Russian minimal demand — to convince him that that was wrong, that Ukraine is able to resist and even to win, maybe.

And then what we saw during all this year, especially starting from this spring, this is a steady escalation on the Ukrainian side supported by Europeans. So at this point, they partially succeeded. I mean, they managed to not change the mind of President Trump, but at least influence this mind. Because I think Trump’s position at this point is, okay, if they can fight, let them fight. It’s not the fact that he suddenly decided to support Ukraine, certainly not. He is simply indifferent. But if they can, why not? Let them try.

And coming back to your question, what we see now, we see now the escalation on the Ukrainian side, which started because of the increased ability to deliver long-range strikes deep into Russian territory. This escalation produced another escalation by the Russian side. And we see now that Russia delivers strikes which Russia did not want to deliver before, to target critical infrastructure in Ukraine on a massive scale. And of course, Russia suffers as well, because, as I said, the ability of Ukraine is quite strong now.

But what does it mean for the course of this war? I’m afraid we are now much more far away from a political solution and from any kind of ceasefire than we were a year ago, when Anchorage was in place.

GLENN DIESEN: Well, whatever I heard about Anchorage — again, we don’t know exactly what the deal was — but again, that was mainly based on an American proposal. Donbas obviously had to go to Russia, but there were rumors that in terms of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, this could end up just freezing the front lines where they were. Again, it’s still unclear, the text was never revealed, but it was Americans who proposed it, but also them who eventually walked away.

And now we see this idea that if they just do some deep strikes into Russia, they would put pressure on Russian society and thus also the Kremlin, so Russia would be more flexible, make more concessions. But it’s unclear to me what they want Russia to do besides this. Is it simply to accept the idea of an unconditional ceasefire? Because it seems like this would be a non-starter. So what are the possible paths now, in your opinion, to put an end to this war through diplomacy? Or are those paths exhausted now?

FYODOR LUKYANOV: Maybe not exhausted. Sooner or later, it will be some kind of path to diplomacy and to political negotiations and then settlement. But actually, if we recall this Anchorage meeting again, I think many of us, including myself, were too optimistic, while we forgot that such kind of conflicts cannot be ended just in one meeting, one important meeting.

Remember Vietnam. Remember that after the moment when the American administration made a conclusion, decided that it should be the end of this war, negotiations took years.