Rueben Dass on the Nexus Between Emerging Technologies and Terrorism in India

Дата публикации: 02-02-2026 07:47:00

Commercial availability and ease of access to drone systems – particularly commercial-off-the-shelf drones – could increase their prominence in terror plots in India.

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In the early hours of November 28 last year, militants of the People’s Liberation Army, a banned Meitei terror group, carried out a drone attack on an Assam Rifles camp located near the India-Myanmar border in Manipur. This was not the first time that militants had deployed drones in an attack in India. On June 27, 2021, Pakistan-based terrorists used drones to drop explosives on Jammu Air Force Station. For several years now, terror groups have been using social media and encrypted messaging platforms to spread incendiary ideologies, recruit, and even guide others in carrying out attacks. Investigations into the car explosion near Delhi’s iconic Red Fort on November 10 last year revealed that the perpetrators were virtually directed by handlers in foreign countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkiye, who sent them bomb-making videos via Telegram and other apps.

In an interview with The Diplomat’s South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran, Rueben Dass, associate research fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the RSIS in Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, described the use of emerging technologies by terrorist groups active in India. He drew attention to the terrorists’ use of open and encrypted platforms to spread ideology and propaganda, crypto financing of terror attacks, and virtual direction of attacks by handlers abroad. Although the use of drones by terrorists in India is still only at a “nascent stage,” this is a matter of concern, as its use is likely to grow.

“If the benefits of drone use outweigh the costs and aligns with the group’s goals, then they will certainly adopt it,” Dass said.

 What are some of the emerging technologies that extremist and terrorist groups in India are using?

Terrorist networks in India have leveraged several technologies, namely social media, drones, and cryptocurrencies, to enhance their operations. Several groups like the Kashmir Tigers, The Resistance Front (TRF), and the People’s Anti-Fascist Front, believed to be fronts for more established groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), have mushroomed in recent times, and they have been very active on social media, utilizing both open platforms like X and Facebook and encrypted platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, and Discord to spread their ideology and propaganda by posting videos, images, and essays. For example, TRF had claimed the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack on Telegram. These groups have also made use of more obscure communications platforms such as Tam Tam, Mastodon, Chirpwire, Enigma, and Matrix.

Apart from using these platforms to spread propaganda, encrypted messaging platforms have been used by Islamic State-linked operations planners since 2015 to recruit and virtually coordinate attacks in India. These types of attacks require no physical interaction between the planner and executor as the entire process of radicalization, coordination, planning, and execution is carried out via virtual means. Some of the platforms that have been used in virtually directed plots targeting India were Telegram, Surespot, Kik, and Threema. The Delhi terror module that carried out the 2025 Red Fort blasts had used Threema, Signal, and Session to communicate with handlers based in foreign countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan. The use of social media communications platforms by Indian terror modules has become significantly more complex and sophisticated, posing serious challenges for the Indian authorities.

Another emerging technology that is of concern, but still at its nascent stage, is the use of drones. Lone actors and independent terrorist networks have increasingly attempted to use drones in attacks on numerous occasions. For example, the Delhi module intended to use drones in its attack, but ultimately failed. Drones have also been used to carry out surveillance and to transport weapons across borders. Commercial availability and ease of access to drone systems – particularly commercial-off-the-shelf drones – could increase their prominence in terror plots in India.

Terror networks in India have also resorted to using cryptocurrencies to raise funds. Several crypto fundraising links have been traced back to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Cryptocurrencies were used to fund the Bengaluru Rameshwaram Café attack in 2024. These digital currencies enable terror networks to avoid detection and maintain anonymity.

How are drones being used by terrorist groups in India and Pakistan?

In India, drones are primarily being used to transport weapons and cash across the border regions between India and Pakistan. Pakistan-based terror modules linked to JeM and LeT have exploited the untraceability and anonymity of small quadcopter drones to transport weapons, ammunition, and cash to operatives in Jammu and Kashmir. Drones offer groups deniability and cut down the risk associated with having a physical operative smuggle weapons across the border. Small, commercial drones often fly at low altitudes and have a low noise signature, making them hard to detect. Drones were used in a recent plot in Gujarat involving an IS-linked terror module that planned to carry out an attack using ricin. The module had received a consignment of weapons consisting of firearms and ammunition that was transported from Pakistan to Rajasthan in India using drones.

Criminal networks have adopted this modus operandi to transport weapons and drugs across border regions.  Drug smuggling involving drones has increased significantly over the last several years, with Indian authorities calling it a “significant threat to India’s internal security.” Border regions such as Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Ferozepur, and Gurdaspur in the Indian Punjab have witnessed a significant rise in narco-drone use. Illicit arms smuggling networks have also used drones to smuggle weapons across the border in the same region.

Terror modules have intended to use drones offensively and beyond just for transporting weapons. The 2025 Delhi module had allegedly planned to use drones and mount explosives on them in the attack. The plan, however, did not go through. Manipur-based insurgents have successfully carried out drone attacks mounted with improvised explosive devices, the most recent being an attack on an Assam Rifles base in Tengnoupal. Videos of the attack showed an improvised explosive device (IED) being dropped from a suspected quadcopter drone mimicking tactics used by insurgents in Myanmar. Maoist rebels were also found to be using commercial DJI drones in certain locations in Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and the border regions. These systems have been used primarily for surveillance and reconnaissance of security forces.

Terrorists have used drones in attacks only rarely in India. Why?

Several reasons explain why the use of drones by terrorist groups has not picked up in India. First is the cost versus utility argument. Commercial drones are relatively cheap and easily accessible. However, they have a limited payload and range. Most small quadcopter drones like the DJI Mavic and Matrice series have a payload capacity ranging from a few hundred grams to approximately 6 kilograms (they might be able to carry a bit more if modified further). Thus, the lethality of these systems with IEDs is limited unless one uses several drones all at once or larger systems like the DJI Agras or FlyCart meant for agriculture. However, larger systems are more expensive. If terror modules are able to inflict a larger amount of damage with conventional methods like IEDs or firearms at a lower cost, then there is no added advantage of using drones. The use of drones in attacks is also likely to elicit a tougher counterterrorism response despite their limited lethality, owing to the publicity that currently surrounds these weapons. This is another consideration that may fall under the decision-making calculus of Indian terror networks.

The use of technological weapons like drones is also dependent on a group’s strategic and operational goals. If drones are able to further a group’s operational goals, particularly in situations where attacks on military, police or security establishments that are hard to reach by ground are favored, then a group might use them. For example, the Tehreek e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have recently adopted commercial drones in attacks against the Pakistani military establishments in regions such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These drones are used to drop improvised munitions on securitized ground targets with limited access. Drones are advantageous in operational environments like these. Baloch groups have recently started using drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, signaling possible future offensive uses. If the benefits of drone use outweigh the costs and aligns with the group’s goals, then they will certainly adopt it.

The other factor that also plays a role is the technical capability to weaponize these drones. Technical capability is acquired via knowledge transfers through online means and physical transfers. ISIS has released detailed online, step-by-step guides on how to weaponize commercial drones. Additionally, there is a plethora of information available online. In some cases, like in Africa, ISIS affiliates from the Middle East have sent drone experts to train operatives in Africa to use drones. Groups that have access to this kind of support and knowledge transfer are likely to use drones more successfully than groups or independent modules that have limited expertise.

You have written about the role of “virtual direction” in terrorists carrying out attacks and sharing expertise. Is this a new phenomenon?

The roots of virtual direction trace back to the late ’00s with the rise of Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent leader of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. Awlaki was a prolific user of the internet, often using platforms like YouTube to post his lectures. He also established a blog, which he used to spread radical ideas, solicit contacts, and establish connections with his followers. Soon, he began directing attacks virtually by encouraging his followers to commit attacks in the West.

Awlaki’s signature was on almost every major terrorist plot in the U.S. in the late 2000s. Some notable ones were the Fort Hood attack in 2009 carried out by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan Malik; the infamous underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to bomb a flight from Amsterdam to Michigan in 2009; and Faizal Shahzad, who plotted a car bomb attack in New York’s Times Square in 2010. Communications, either physical or virtual, were traced back to Awlaki.

ISIS, on the other hand, took virtual direction to the next level by industrializing this methodology and establishing specialized teams of foreign operatives based in Iraq and Syria, who were tasked to plot foreign operations by recruiting, encouraging and directing individuals from their home countries primarily through social media. Amniyat al-Kharji was believed to be the unit responsible for coordinating external operations and was under the purview of ISIS’s chief propagandist, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. The rise and popularity of social media and encrypted messaging platforms had a key role to play in the industrialization of this method by ISIS. Some notable virtual planners were Junaid Hussain (British), Rachid Kassim (French), Tojiddin Nazarov (Tajik), Neil Prakash (Australian), Muhammad Wanndy (Malaysian) and Bahrun Naim (Indonesian).

In the Indian context, a key virtual planner was Shafi Armar (Abu Yusuf al-Hindi), who was linked to at least two attack plots: a 2015 plot in Hyderabad involving firearms and explosives, and a potential knife and suicide bomb plot targeting foreigners and U.S. interests in Srinagar and Kolkata. He was believed to be in contact with approximately 800 individuals through Facebook at the time.

After counterterrorism operations eliminated many of the virtual planners in Iraq and Syria, virtual direction saw a decline. However, in recent times, this attack method has been taken up by IS affiliates such as Islamic State Khorasan Province in a more decentralized form. The virtual planner roles have been assumed by more obscure, anonymous individuals based in different countries throughout the world trying to encourage vulnerable and radicalized ISIS sympathizers to carry out attacks. Sympathizers are also encouraging each other to carry out attacks. Apart from the Delhi and Gujarat plots, notable attacks that had a possible virtual direction signature were the 2024 Crocus Hall attack in Moscow and Kerman attacks in Iran.

Is virtual direction easy to trace by counterterrorism officials? For example, if Indian agents were directing ops in Balochistan or Pakistani agents in Kashmir, wouldn’t it be easy to pin accountability? So, is this advantageous?

Most of the virtually directed plots between 2014 and 2020 resulted in failure. This may have been due to the susceptibility of online communications to interdiction or the lack of experience of operatives on the ground. The traceability of virtually directed plots is dependent on the platforms that are being used, the intelligence capabilities of the authorities in question and intelligence cooperation between friendly agencies. The latter is often important in transnational cases where friendly agencies pick up intelligence on an imminent plot and share it with the relevant parties.

The increasing use of encrypted messaging platforms has made detection harder and more complex. Ten years ago, when Facebook was still being used widely, detection was simpler. However, with the emergence of encrypted messaging platforms, detection and interdiction have become more complex. That said, numbers and communications channels can always be linked back to the source if these are not masked properly. Operational security, which is often emphasized and encouraged on online terrorist forums, is key in preventing detection.

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