Across Europe, leaders and defence planners are reassessing long-standing security arrangements after a turbulent year of US foreign-policy moves. The debate intensified at the Munich Security Conference, where signs of a changing transatlantic relationship and fresh efforts to build European resilience were on full display.

In cities from Munich to Tallinn, public campaigns and private investment now highlight defence technology and preparedness. One striking advertisement on a scaffolding-wrapped church declared, “Europe’s security under construction”, while southern Germany has emerged as a hub for defence-related research and industry, concentrating on AI, drones and aerospace.

Surveys and official guidance appear to reflect growing unease. A Eurobarometer poll found that around 68% of Europeans feel their country is under threat. Germany’s Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance has warned that war is no longer “unlikely” and has recommended household emergency food supplies of three to ten days.

Berlin has stepped forward as a major supporter of Ukraine and a growing military investor. With the United States reportedly pausing new direct aid, Germany is now the single largest national donor of military and other assistance to Kyiv. The scale of Germany’s planned defence spending has drawn attention: Mark Rutte pointed to the €150bn Germany says it will spend and described it as “a staggering amount”.

Public opinion in many European countries is pushing governments toward greater self-reliance in security. That shift is visible in policy debates about defence budgets and in calls for stronger regional cooperation — from Nordic-Baltic groupings to ad-hoc coalitions that include partners beyond Europe.

For many attendees at the Munich Security Conference, the central issue was the state of relations between Europe and the United States. The presence of senior US officials underscored competing messages: reassurance about shared history and values alongside a clear demand that European states increase their own capacity.

The speech by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio drew a large, attentive audience. Onstage he told delegates, “We want Europe to be strong,” adding that “The two great wars of the last century serve for us as a constant reminder that ultimately our destiny is, and will always be, intertwined with yours.”

Yet Rubio’s address also echoed themes associated with the current White House: scepticism of certain multilateral approaches and calls for allies to align on a narrower set of priorities. That conditional offer of partnership — warm in tone but demanding in substance — left some European figures uneasy.

Many Europeans still recall episodes that damaged trust: a high-profile comment about Greenland that alarmed Denmark, and past US decisions seen as instrumentalising intelligence or aid to influence diplomatic outcomes. Denmark’s prime minister told the conference that the episode over Greenland remained unresolved, and the fallout has continued to shape diplomatic attitudes.

Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, summed up one strain of feeling when he said, “We got used to the strong support from the US; we got used to our comfort zone in which we used to live. This time is over, definitely over,” and added, “Washington was right.”

Speakers at Munich highlighted growing divergence within Europe over how far to move toward strategic autonomy and how quickly to increase defence spending. Some countries on Europe’s eastern and northern flanks favor rapid strengthening; others, particularly in the south, are more resistant to sharp budget increases.

Rachel Ellehuus of the Royal United Services Institute warned of a narrow window for action: “They have 5-10 years to stand on their own two feet in terms of conventional defence capabilities.” Policymakers in capitals with tighter budgets face hard choices about taxes, welfare and borrowing in order to meet those requirements.

Not all nervousness stems from policy alone. One European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, described recent US behaviour with a stark analogy: “A bit like a (psychologically) abusive partner,” adding, “He reminded Europe how wonderful the (transatlantic) relationship used to be, but he then switched to coercion: If you want things to be good between us in the future, you have to do as I say!”

At the same time, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen cautioned that trust had been damaged: “Some lines have been crossed that cannot be uncrossed anymore,” she said. “Europeans have suffered shock therapy.”

Officials from the US administration signalled a reorientation of US priorities, placing greater emphasis on the Indo-Pacific while urging European partners to shoulder more of their own defence burden. U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby put it plainly at a meeting of NATO defence ministers: “Under President Trump’s leadership, we are reprioritising the defence of our homeland and the protection of our interests in our Hemisphere,” and he warned that the US would become “a more limited and focused” presence in Europe.

That framing has spurred talk of a revamped NATO and new, flexible coalitions. Some European leaders and outside partners — including Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand — are described as forming “like-minded” groupings to address specific security and supply-chain challenges.

French President Emmanuel Macron and others stress that strategic autonomy must cover energy, critical technologies and trade as well as traditional military capabilities. The European Commission president acknowledged that a subset of EU members might have to move ahead if the whole bloc could not act fast enough.

In Munich, the UK leader argued for deeper UK-Europe defence integration to reduce costs, while insisting that London would not sever ties with the United States. Sir Keir Starmer presented cooperation with European partners as a complement to transatlantic ties, not a replacement.

Observers noted that this posture reflects an effort to triangulate between competing pressures — sustaining the transatlantic alliance while strengthening regional European cooperation.

The Munich gathering underscored that the post-Cold War order anchored by US leadership is evolving. European states are experimenting with faster, smaller coalitions and stepping up national defence efforts, but the continent remains reliant on aspects of US military capability and technological leadership.

As one senior US official suggested, a new version of NATO and a realignment of priorities may emerge. The shape of that future — whether it will be close, conditional partnership or a looser, more autonomous European defence posture — remains open.