The latest China-U.S. summit, held from September 23 to 25, raised concerns in Japan, not so much because of its substance as because of how it appeared. Japanese media have paid particular attention to Donald Trump and Xi Jinping’s references to their respective countries as former “allies” that fought against imperial Japan, as well as to Trump’s apparent intentions. Within the Japanese government, “confusion” has reportedly been expressed internally.

Before the summit, the Japanese government had been preparing for the worst-case scenario, a concern presumably heightened by the U.S. president’s suggestion, immediately after his previous summit with Xi, that arms shipments to Taiwan could be used as a possible “negotiation tool.” 

Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae was able to secure a meeting with Trump before his meeting with Xi. Following her brief meeting with Trump, Takaichi indicated that their conversation had “the U.S.-China summit in mind” and that they had exchanged views in a timely manner on various issues concerning China. She also noted that “it is important that U.S.-China relations contribute to stability in international relations, including between Japan and the United States,” implying that Japan would prefer the U.S. not to pursue a unilateral deal with China that could come at Japan’s expense.

After the Trump-Xi summit, Japan has seemingly sought to manage expectations and reassure the public. Immediately after the meeting, Takaichi posted on X in Japanese that Trump had provided her with a “detailed explanation of the recent U.S.-China summit.” She also highlighted the significance of holding “two meetings between our leaders within the span of a single week,” describing this as a “demonstration of the strength of the Japan-U.S. alliance.”

Reports reinforcing the narrative that the China-U.S. détente does not overshadow Japan-U.S. relations have also emerged from unofficial government sources. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, several Japanese government officials told the newspaper that Trump reportedly praised Takaichi in his talks with Xi, describing her as a “strong leader,” and urged the leaders of Japan and China to hold talks with each other, among other remarks.

Despite Trump’s propensity for unconventional remarks, which understandably raise concerns about the future direction of U.S. policy toward Japan and the rest of the world, bureaucratic cooperation between the two countries has continued to deepen. Meanwhile, Piero Tozzi, a policy expert affiliated with the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), a conservative U.S. think tank close to Trump, has emphasized that the current administration continues to view China as a strategic competitor.

However, perceptions matter when it comes to maintaining a stable Japan-U.S. relationship, which helps explain the Japanese government’s considerable efforts to influence the outcome of the China-U.S. summit and shape the narrative surrounding it. 

Following the Vietnam War, which a significant portion of the Japanese public regarded as an immoral and unnecessary war against the Vietnamese, and the two so-called “Nixon Shocks” – Washington’s abrupt shift toward China and its unilateral economic measures in 1971 – the Japanese public’s perception of the United States deteriorated sharply. Both developments were particularly jarring because they were undertaken with little or no prior consultation with Tokyo, reinforcing a sense in Japan that Washington could fundamentally alter the strategic and economic environment without taking Japanese interests into account. 

Indeed, the U.S. government itself recognized that Nixon’s dual announcement, which came without prior consultation with Japan, had produced major shock waves in the country. Seeking to repair the damage to bilateral relations, Nixon subsequently made a point of meeting with the Japanese emperor and empress. While Nixon’s secrecy surrounding the opening to China, which rattled the Japanese public most deeply, was driven more by his desire to outmaneuver his “enemies” – ranging from State Department officials to the media – than by a commitment to unilateralism, what mattered to Japan was less the substance of the decision than the lack of diplomatic courtesy.

The deterioration in American popularity in Japan was striking. According to polling, the proportion of Japanese who said they liked the U.S. fell from 33 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1973 – a decline of nearly half. The dynamics seen in the 1970s attest to the importance of the “theater” of international relations and its impact on Japanese perceptions of the world. A similar concern – or perhaps the lessons learned from that period – seems to be shaping the present moment, as the notable shift in tone between the United States and China is generating speculation about how the structure of world affairs will continue to evolve.

However, there are important differences in the concerns of the Japanese public today. While U.S. distrust in the 1970s was partly driven by fears of being entrapped in the Vietnam War, as well as by a sense that the U.S. was attempting to contain Japan’s postwar economic miracle – a source of considerable national pride – these are not the same emotions that Japanese people are experiencing today. In one of the most tense security environments in recent decades, and amid the decline of U.S. relative strength, Japanese concerns are centered more on abandonment than entrapment. Moreover, Japan no longer sees the U.S. as an economic competitor, as it did during the 1970s, but rather as an opportunity for economic growth.

This is not to say that Japanese concerns are trivial. The highly personalized nature of U.S. foreign policy today will continue to fuel concerns that spheres of influence could emerge in the Indo-Pacific and that Taiwan could be “lost.” To avert such a situation, day-to-day diplomacy with the United States matters. In the immediate aftermath of the Trump-Xi summit, Japan’s approach appears to be working.